Logic and Rational Reconstruction of Science from a Pragmatic Point of View

Recent research on logical empiricism and more particularly on Carnap’s work have shown the central - and complex - role played by the pragmatic approach in the project of rational reconstruction of science (Awodey, Carus, Friedman, Goldfarb, Mancosu, Richardson, Uebel and alii.). One basic idea of this project (from the Aufbau to The Logical Syntax of Language) is that knowledge can be reconstructed and unified according to the standards of logic ("the logical structure of knowledge") which, in return, guarantee it objectivity. Following Carnap’s principle of tolerance there are no ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ choices of language forms and so it raises the question of the nature of the relationship between natural language, logic or formal languages and the language of science.

This workshop has two main objectives: 1) to work on a conceptual reassessment of the project of rational reconstruction from a pragmatic point of view (including both the epistemological and methodological sides) and 2) to discuss the actuality of Carnap’s pragmatism (pure or descriptive) which is the heart of this project and this, by taking heed of recent research in:

• logic: the practical and the dynamic turns in formal semantics, logical truth, pluralism, the classical and nonclassical logics and formalism.

• pragmatic: the American and German pragmatisms, the neo-pragmatism and the new pragmatism (e.g. the analytical pragmatism put forward by Brandom or Price’s pragmatic normative naturalism).

How does this work influence the notion of rationality with regard to the "actual process of cognition"? In what sense do these works enlighten our understanding of the limits and achievements of Carnap’s project of rational reconstruction from a ‘pragmatic’ point of view? Upon questions such as these is the workshop structured.