Mohammadreza ESMKHANI

In my PhD dissertation, dealing with the so-called social-rational dichotomy, I’m trying to answer this problem: In exactly what sense is (scientific) knowledge both “social” and “rational”? Admittedly, the question requires an urgent, adequate response, because, in many quarters, these two important predicates of knowledge are widely considered mutually exclusive: an apparently nonepistemic property v. an essentially epistemic one. In general, my aim is to defend an account of the sociality of knowledge which is sensitive to, or responsive to, the rational considerations.

My main philosophical interests are as follows: philosophy of language (especially, theories of meaning), philosophy of science (especially, theories of rationality), social epistemology (especially, social constructivism), and history of modern-contemporary philosophy. At the secondary level, I’m also interested in the central issues in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and ethics.